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Prosocial Lies: When Deception Breeds Trust

Abstract

Philosophers, psychologists, and economists have long asserted that deception harms
trust. We challenge this claim. Across four studies, we demonstrate that prosocial
deception can increase trust. Specifically, prosocial lies increase the willingness to pass
money in the trust game, a behavioral measure of benevolence-based trust. In Studies 1a
and 1b, we find that altruistic lies increase trust when deception is directly experienced
and when it is merely observed. In Study 2, we demonstrate that mutually beneficial lies
also increase trust. In Study 3, we disentangle the effects of intentions and deception;
intentions are far more important than deception for building benevolence-based trust. In
Study 4, we show that although prosocial lies increase benevolence-based trust, they
harm integrity-based trust. To measure integrity-based trust behavior, we introduce a new
economic game, the Rely-or-Verify game. Our findings expand our understanding of
deception and deepen our insight into the mechanics of trust.
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Trust is essential to organizations and interpersonal relationships (e.g., Blau,
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1964; Golembiewski & McConkie, 1975; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Lewicki, Tomlinson, &
Gillespie, 2006; Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985; Valley, Moag, & Bazerman, 1998).
Trust increases leadership effectiveness (Atwater, 1988; Bazerman, 1994; Dirks, 2000),
improves the stability of economic and political exchange (Hosmer, 1995), reduces
transaction costs (Granovetter, 1985), facilitates cooperation (Valley et al., 1998), and
helps firms and individuals manage risk (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998). Golembiewski
and McConkie (1975, p. 131) argued that, “There is no single variable which so
thoroughly influences interpersonal and group behavior as does trust.”
Consistent with prior research, we define trust as, “a psychological state
comprising the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the
intentions or behavior of another” (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395). A
significant body of research has documented the negative effects of violating trust. For
example, trust violations can harm cooperation and bargaining outcomes (Lount, Zhong,
Sivanathan, & Murnighan, 2008; Croson, Boles, & Murninghan, 2003), lower
organizational commitment (Robinson, 1996), provoke retaliation (Bies & Tripp, 2006),
and, in more serious cases, trigger organizational-level failures (Gillepsie & Dietz, 2009).
Although there are many ways to harm trust, existing research identifies one
behavior as particularly toxic to trust: deception (e.g., Santoro & Paine, 1993; Boles,
Croson, & Murninghan, 2000; Carr, 1968; O’Connor & Carnavale, 1997; Schweitzer &
Croson, 1999; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006; Croson et al., 2003; Bok, 1978).
Prior research suggests that deception is theoretically, philosophically, and empirically
damaging to interpersonal trust. For example, philosopher Sir Francis Bacon argued that

dishonesty deprives, “people of two of the most principal instruments for interpersonal
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action—trust and belief” (from “On Truth”, cited in Tyler & Feldman, 2006). Empirical
research has also demonstrated that deception harms relationships (Ford, King, &
Hollender, 1988; Lewis & Saarni, 1993; Tyler & Feldman, 2006), elicits negative affect
(Planalp, Rutherford, & Honeycutt, 1988), decreases liking, (Tyler, Feldman, & Reichert,
2006) and triggers retaliation (Boles et al., 2000; Croson et al., 2003). Furthermore, trust
scholars have found that acts of deception cause enduring harm to trust. Though
individuals can often repair trust following a violation (e.g., Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, &
Dirks, 2004; Schweitzer et al., 2006), trust violations accompanied by deception
irrevocably harm trust (Schweitzer et al., 2006).
We challenge the prevailing assumption that deception harms trust. We argue that
most philosophers, psychologists, and economists, have confounded deceptive behavior
with selfish intentions and outcomes. As a result, prior research that has documented the
harmful effects of deception may really tell us more about the consequences of selfish
behavior than deception per se.
We break new ground by demonstrating that some forms of deception increase
trust. Across four experiments, we demonstrate that prosocial lying can increase
behavioral and attitudinal measures of interpersonal trust. Consistent with prior work, we
define deception as the transmission of information that intentionally misleads others
(see Murnighan, 1991; Boles et al., 2000; Gino & Shea, 2012). We define prosocial
deception as a type of deception. Prosocial lies involve the transmission of information
that misleads and benefits a target (Levine & Schweitzer, 2014).

Our program of research expands our understanding of trust by highlighting the
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primacy of benevolence for building interpersonal trust. In our investigation, we explore
distinct forms of trust and deception. We are the first to demonstrate that some common
forms of deception can increase trust.
We report results from a series of experiments. In Studies 1, 2, and 3, participants
experienced or observed deception and made trust game decisions. Across these studies,
we find that prosocial lies increase trust. This is true when deception is directly
experienced (Study 1a) and when it is merely observed (Study 1b). This pattern is also
true when the prosocial lies are mutually beneficial and help both the target and the
deceiver (Study 2).
In Studies 3a and 3b, we disentangle the effects of lying from the effects of
prosocial and selfish intentions. When we control for intentions, we find that deception
itself has no effect on trusting behavior. In other words, the decision to pass in the trust
game reflects perceptions of benevolence, which is not undermined by deception.
Prosocial intentions, regardless of whether they are associated with deception or honesty,
significantly increase benevolence-based trust. In Study 3b, we demonstrate that our
results do not simply reflect a negative reaction to selfish behavior. Instead, we find that
prosocial deception increases trust compared to a neutral control condition.
In our final study, we explore how prosocial deception influences distinct types of
trust. The trust game measures benevolence-based trust. We introduce a new economic
game, the Rely-or-Verify game, to measure integrity-based trust. Although prosocial
lying increases trust rooted in benevolence, it harms trust rooted in integrity. We
demonstrate that the same action can have divergent effects on different dimensions of
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trust.
Prosocial lying

Prosocial lying is a common feature of everyday communication. For example, an
employee may tell a colleague that they delivered an excellent presentation when they did
not, or thank a gift giver for a gift they would have rather not received.
As children, we learn to tell prosocial lies to be polite (Talwar, Murphy, & Lee,
2007; Broomfield, Robinson, & Robinson, 2002). Prosocial deception is also common in
adult relationships (Tyler & Feldman, 2004). Adults lie in roughly 20% of their everyday
social interactions (DePaulo & Bell, 1996), and most of these lies are prosocial (DePaulo
& Kashy, 1998).
Individuals’ endorsement of prosocial lies reflects the broader approval of
unethical behaviors that help others. For example, individuals are more willing to cheat
when cheating restores equity (Gino & Pierce, 2009, 2010a; Schweitzer & Gibson, 2008),
helps disadvantaged others (Gino & Pierce, 2010b), and when the spoils of cheating are
shared with others (Wiltermuth, 2011; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2013). With respect to
deception, prior experimental work has found that individuals are more willing to tell
prosocial lies than selfish lies (Erat & Gneezy, 2012) and perceive them to be more
ethical (Levine & Schweitzer, 2014).
Prosocial lying serves a number of interpersonal aims. While many prosocial lies
are motivated by an altruistic desire to protect relational partners (e.g. DePaulo & Kashy,
1998) or provide interpersonal support (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Goffman, 1967), other
lies have both prosocial and self-serving motives. For example, prosocial lying can be
used to avoid conflict and facilitate uncomfortable social situations. When a wife asks her

husband if she looks fat in her dress, the husband may lie not only to protect his wife’s
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feelings, but also to avoid conflict and a lengthy discussion about diet and exercise.
In the present research, we define altruistic lies as, “false statements that are
costly for the liar and are made with the intention of misleading and benefitting a target”
(Levine & Schweitzer, 2014: p. 108). We define mutually beneficial lies as false
statements that are beneficial for the liar and are made with the intention of
misleading and benefitting the target. We conceptualize altruistic and mutually beneficial
lies as a subset of prosocial lies. Consistent with Bok (1978), we also distinguish between
prosocial lies and white lies. White lies involve small stakes and can be prosocial or selfserving. Unlike white lies, prosocial lies can have large stakes. For example, some
doctors misrepresent prognoses to give their patients comfort in their final weeks of life
(e.g., Iezzoni, Rao, DesRoches, Vogeli, & Campbell, 2012).
Prosocial lies and trust
Prosocial lies are particularly relevant to the study of trust because they reflect a
conflict between two central antecedents of trust: benevolence and integrity. Trust
reflects an individual’s expectation about another person’s behavior. In contrast with
research that conceptualizes trust as a belief about one’s ability to carry out
organizational duties or effectively perform a particular job (Kim et al., 2004; Kim,
Dirks, Cooper, & Ferrin, 2006; Ferrin, Kim, Cooper, & Dirks, 2007), we investigate trust
with respect to interpersonal relationships. Consistent with prior research (e.g. Lewicki &
Bunker, 1995; Rousseau et al., 1998), we conceptualize interpersonal trust as the
willingness to be vulnerable to exploitation within an interpersonal interaction.
Scholars have converged on three qualities of the trustee (the individual who is

trusted) that uniquely influence interpersonal trust: benevolence, ability, and integrity
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(Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Butler, 1991). Benevolence reflects the degree to
which an individual has positive intentions or a desire to help the truster (Butler &
Cantrell, 1984; Mayer et al., 1995). Ability reflects an individual’s technical skills,
competence, and expertise in a specific context (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; Giffin, 1967;
Sitkin & Roth, 1993). Integrity reflects an individual’s ethicality and reputation for
honesty (Mayer et al., 1995; Butler & Cantrell, 1984). In this work, we investigate the
tension between benevolence and integrity.
We postulate that when benevolence and integrity conflict, benevolence will often
be more important than integrity. We draw on prior trust, corruption, and personperception research, to build our thesis.
Prior trust research suggests that benevolence may be particularly important for
trust in interpersonal interactions. In dyadic relationships, trust hinges on concerns related
to exploitation (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Lewicki & Bunker, 1995; Bhattacharya,
Devinney & Pillutla, 1998), and perceptions of benevolence can allay these concerns.
This idea is consistent with work that has documented the importance of motive
attributions, beliefs about a counterpart’s intentions, in interpersonal trust (e.g., Weber,
Malhotra, & Murnighan, 2004; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002; Pillutla, Malhotra, &
Murnighan, 2003; Dunn, Ruedy, & Schweitzer, 2012; Lount & Pettit, 2012). Individuals
who are perceived to have benevolent motives are perceived to be less likely to exploit a
potential truster, and consequently, are more likely to be trusted. For example, lower
status individuals are perceived to have benevolent motives and engender greater trust
(Lount & Pettit, 2012).

The relationship between perceived integrity and interpersonal trust is less clear.
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One challenge is the subjective nature of integrity: “the trustee adheres to a set of
principles that the truster finds acceptable” (Mayer et al., 1995, p. 719; Kim et al., 2004).
Another challenge is the frequent confounding of benevolence and integrity (e.g. Kim et
al., 2004; Schweitzer et al., 2006). Extant trust research has studied behaviors that violate
ethical principles and cause harm to others, reflecting low integrity and low benevolence.
For example, prior work has studied lies that exploit others for financial gain (Koning,
Steinel, Beest, & van Dijk, 2011; Steinel & De Dreu, 2004; Schweitzer et al., 2006).
These lies violate the principle of honesty and demonstrate selfishness. Not surprisingly,
these lies harm trust. However, an individual may also lie to benefit a counterpart. This
behavior violates the principle of honesty, but demonstrates benevolence. Existing
research does not give us insight into how individuals might resolve these competing
signals.
However, research on corruption and favoritism provides evidence that
individuals, at times, place enormous trust in others who have demonstrated low
integrity. For example, there is high trust within crime rings (Baccara & Bar-Isaac, 2008;
Bowles & Gintis, 2004) and within communities that have been influenced by organized
crime (Meier, Pierce, & Vaccaro, 2013). In these cases, there is high trust among ingroup members, but low trust in out-group members. Individuals within the group are
trusted because they care for and protect in-group members, even if they signal low
integrity with respect to their relationships with out-group members.
We conjecture that the concern for benevolence is more deeply rooted than the
concern for integrity in interpersonal relationships. A preference for ethical rules, such as

fairness and honesty, may be rooted in the broader concern of protecting people from
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harm (Gray, Young, & Wayts, 2012; Turiel, 1983). That is, benevolence may be the
primary concern and integrity may be a derivative, secondary concern. Consistent with
this proposition, Levine & Schweitzer (2014) found that when honesty harms other
people and deception does not, honesty is perceived to be less ethical than deception.
We hypothesize that an individual will engender trust when they project high
benevolence, even if they also project low integrity. Perceptions of benevolence, rather
than perceptions of integrity, may explain why individuals are willing to be vulnerable to
interpersonal exploitation. As a result, we hypothesize that prosocial lies, which
demonstrate high benevolence, but low integrity, can build trust.
In our first three studies, we focus our investigation on the positive relationship
between prosocial lies and trust. In these studies, we explore the relationship between
prosocial lying and passing in the trust game, a benevolence-based measure of trust. In
our final study, we explore the boundaries of the relationship between deception and trust
by examining the relationship between prosocial lies and integrity-based trust.
Overview of current research
Across our studies, we use deception games (adapted from Erat & Gneezy, 2012;
Cohen, Gunia, Kim-Jun, & Murnighan, 2009; Gneezy, 2005) and trust games (adapted
from Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). We use deception games to operationalize
prosocial lies because these games allow us to cleanly manipulate the intentions
associated with deception and, consequently, draw causal inferences about the role of
intentions and deception in building trust.
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We use the trust game because it operationalizes the fundamental components of
an interpersonal trusting decision: the willingness to be vulnerable based on positive
expectations of another (Rousseau et al., 1998; Pillutla et al., 2003). The trust game is
also the predominant paradigm used to measure trust throughout psychology and
economics (e.g., Berg et al., 1995; Schweitzer et al., 2006; McCabe, Rigdon, & Smith,
2003; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & Soutter, 2000; Malhotra & Murninghan, 2002;
Malhotra, 2004). In the standard trust game, the truster is endowed with money and has
the opportunity to keep the money or pass the money to the trustee. The amount of

money grows if the truster passes it to the trustee. The trustee then has the opportunity to
either return some portion of the money to the truster or keep all of the money for
himself. The truster’s initial decision to pass money represents trust (Pillutla et al., 2003;
McCabe et al., 2003; Glaeser et al., 2000; Malhotra & Murninghan, 2002; Malhotra,
2004). Though trust game decisions may also reflect preferences for equality and risk
(Ashraf, Bohnet, & Piankov, 2003), the external validity of trust game decisions has been
documented with financial investment decisions (e.g., Karlan, 2005) and prior work that
has closely linked trust game behavior with attitudinal measures of trust (e.g., Houser,
Schunk, & Winter, 2010; Schweitzer et al., 2006).
Across our studies, we investigate different types of prosocial lies. We begin by
examining the consequences of altruistic lies. In Study 1a, participants were paired with a
confederate who either told an altruistic lie to the participant or was selfishly honest.
Participants then played a trust game with the confederate. In Study 1a, we find that
being deceived increases trust; participants were more trusting of confederates who lied
to them than confederates who were honest. In Study 1b, we rule out reciprocity as an

alternative explanation. In this study, participants observed, rather than experienced,
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altruistic deception and then made trust decisions. We find that individuals trust altruistic
liars, even when they did not benefit from the prosocial deception.
In Study 2, we extend our investigation by examining different types of lies. In
this study, we find that even when prosocial lying helps the liar, deception increases trust;
non-altruistic prosocial lies, and mutually beneficial lies increase trust. In Studies 3a and
3b, we isolate the effects of intentions and deception by manipulating them orthogonally.
In Study 3a, we find that deception itself has no direct effect on interpersonal trust, but
that intentions matter immensely. Prosocial individuals who told lies or were honest were
trusted far more than selfish individuals who lied or were honest. In Study 3b, we include
two control conditions and demonstrate that relative to control conditions, prosocial
intentions increase trust and selfish intentions decrease trust.
In our final study, we explore how prosocial lying influences distinct types of
trust. We introduce a new economic game, the Rely-or-Verify game, to measure
integrity-based trust. We manipulate prosocial lying using a repeated deception game and
find that prosocial lying increases benevolence-based trust, but decreases integrity-based
trust. Across all of our studies, our sample size or the number of days that the study
would run was determined in advance, and no conditions or variables were dropped from
any analyses we report (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011).
Study 1
In Study 1a and 1b, we explore the relationship between altruistic lying and
trusting behavior. In Study 1a, participants played a trust game with a counterpart who
either lied to them or told them the truth. In Study 1b, participants observed an individual

who told an altruistic lie or a selfish truth to a third party. Together, Studies 1a and 1b
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demonstrate that altruistic deception can increase trust and that this result is not driven by
direct reciprocity.
Study 1a
Method
Participants. We recruited 125 adults to participate in an online study in
exchange for payment via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Procedure and Materials. In this study, we randomly assigned participants to
one of two conditions in a between-subjects design. Participants played a deception game
with an individual who either told an altruistic lie or was selfishly honest. Participants
then played a trust game with the same partner.
Manipulation of altruistic lies. We used a modified deception game (Erat &
Gneezy; 2012; Cohen et al., 2009; Gneezy, 2005; Levine & Schweitzer, 2014) to
operationalize altruistic lies. We referred to the deception game as “Exercise 1” in the
experiment.
In our version of the deception game, two individuals were paired and randomly
assigned to the role of either Sender or Receiver. The payoffs for each pair of participants
(one Sender and one Receiver) were determined by the outcome of a computer-simulated
coin flip and the choices the participants made. In the deception game, the Sender had the
opportunity to lie to the Receiver about the outcome of the coin flip. In the experiment,
we refer to the potential liar as “the Sender.”
The deception game unfolded in the following steps:

1. Senders were told the outcome of a computer-simulated coin flip. In our
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study, the coin always landed on heads.
2. The Sender then had to report the outcome of the coin flip to his/her
partner, the Receiver. The Sender could send one of two possible
messages to the Receiver. The message could read, “The coin landed on
heads” or “The coin landed on tails.”
o The Sender knew that the outcome the Receiver chose (heads or
tails) determined the payment in the experiment. The Sender also
knew that the only information the Receiver would have was the
message from the Sender and that most Receivers chose the
outcome indicated in the Sender’s message.
o The Sender knew there were two possible payment options, A and
B. If the Receiver chose the correct outcome, the Sender and the
Receiver would be paid according to Option A. Otherwise, the
Sender and the Receiver would be paid according to Option B.
3. In Study 1a, Option A was $2 for the Sender and $0 for the Receiver.
Option B was $1.75 for the Sender and $1 for the Receiver. Throughout
our studies, we manipulated the payments associated with Option A and
Option B to operationalize different types of lies. We summarize the
payoffs associated with each choice in Table 1.
4. After receiving the Sender’s message, the Receiver had to choose an
outcome: heads or tails. The Receiver knew that his/her choice determined
the payment in the experiment, but the Receiver did not know the payoffs

associated with the choice. The Sender’s message was the only piece of
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information the Receiver had.
Therefore, Senders faced the following options:
A.

Send an honest message, e.g. “The coin landed on heads.”
Honesty was most likely to lead to an outcome that was costly to the
Receiver, and benefitted the Sender (i.e. selfish).

B.

Send a dishonest message, e.g. “The coin landed on tails.”
Lying was most likely to lead to an outcome that benefitted the Receiver,
and was costly to the Sender (i.e. altruistic).

In Study 1a, we assigned all participants to the role of Receiver and informed
them that their decisions would be matched with the decisions of a previous participant,
who had been assigned to the role of Sender. After reading the instructions for the
deception game and passing a comprehension check 1, participants received a message
from their partner, the Sender. The Sender’s message either read “The coin landed on
heads” (the Selfish Honesty condition) or “The coin landed on tails” (the Altruistic Lie
condition). Participants then made their prediction by choosing either “Heads” or
“Tails.” 2 Participants did not know the possible payoffs when they made their choice.
After making their choice, participants learned more information about the
deception game. Specifically, we gave them all of the Sender’s private information.

1

Participants had to pass two comprehension checks, one for the deception game and one for the trust
game, in order to complete the entire study. Participants who failed a comprehension check had the
opportunity to reread the instructions for the exercise and retake the comprehension check. If any
participant failed a comprehension check twice, they were not allowed to complete the study. We followed
this procedure in every study.

2

A total of 89% of participants actually chose the outcome indicated in their partner’s message. Whether or
not participants chose the outcome indicated in the message did not influence our results. That is, our
results are not influenced by whether or not participants were successfully deceived.

Participants learned that the Sender knew the coin had landed on heads. Therefore,
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participants learned that the Sender either lied to them or had been honest. In addition,
participants learned the payoffs associated with the Sender’s choice. Therefore,
participants learned that lying was altruistic and honesty was selfish. This was our
manipulation of altruistic lying.
After participants learned about the information their partner knew as the Sender
in the deception game, participants played a trust game with the Sender. We referred to
the trust game as “Exercise 2” in the experiment. We ran a pilot study with a nonoverlapping sample (N = 40) in order to generate real decisions with which to match the
decisions of participants in our main study.
The trust game. In our trust game, we assigned all participants to the role of
Player 1 and told them that they would be paired with the Sender with whom they had
just been paired with in Exercise 1 (the deception game). In our version of the trust game,
Player 1 was given $1 and could make one of two choices: “Keep $1” or “Pass $1.”
Choosing “Keep $1” led to a payout of $1 for Player 1 and $0 for his partner, Player 2. If
Player 1 passed the $1, the money would grow to $3 and Player 2 could then either
choose to “Keep $3” or “Return $1.50.”
Dependent variables.
Trusting behavior. The choice to pass money in the trust game served as our
primary dependent variable. In addition, after making a decision, participants rated their
partner’s trustworthiness, benevolence, and deception. For all attitudinal measures, we
used 7-point Likert scales anchored at 1 = “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree”.
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Attitudinal trust. We measured attitudinal trust with two items (r(121) = .89): “I
trust Player 2 to RETURN money,” and “I am confident that Player 2 will RETURN
money.”

Perceived benevolence. We measured perceived benevolence using three items (α
= .80): “This person is [kind, nice, and selfish (reverse-scored)].”
Perceived deception. We used three items to measure the extent to which our
manipulation was recognized as deception (α = .84): “This person sent an honest message
as a Sender in Exercise 1” (reverse-scored), “This person lied about the outcome of the
coin flip in Exercise 1,” and, “This person deceived his/her partner in Exercise 1.”
After participants submitted their responses, we asked two multiple-choice recall
questions, 3 collected demographic information, and asked participants what they thought
the purpose of the study was. Participants then received a bonus payment based upon
their decisions.
Results
We report results from the 121 adults (45% female; M age = 32years, SD = 9.77)
who passed all comprehension checks and completed the entire study; 4 participants
failed a comprehension check at the start of the experiment and were automatically
eliminated from the study. We present the means and standard deviations of each of our
scales, as well as the inter-scale correlation matrix in Table 2.
Trusting behavior. Supporting our thesis, participants were significantly more
likely to trust a partner who told them an altruistic lie (56%), than a partner who was
honest (32%), χ2 (1, N = 121) = 6.88, p < .01. Figure 1 depicts these results.
3

In every study, at least 80% of participants were able to recall the manipulation at the end of the study.
For each study, we report analyses for the entire sample, but our results are unchanged when we restrict our
sample to only those who answered the recall questions correctly.

Attitudinal Trust. Our attitudinal trust measure parallels our behavioral trust
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results. Participants reported that they trusted their partners more in the Altruistic Lie
condition (M = 3.77, SD = 1.91) than in the Selfish Honesty condition (M = 2.72, SD =
1.76), F(1, 119) = 9.85, p < .01. Our behavioral and attitudinal measures of trust were
highly correlated, r(121) = .89, p < .001, suggesting that passing decisions reflected trust
beliefs.
Perceived Benevolence. Participants also perceived their partners to be more
benevolent in the Altruistic Lie condition (M = 4.19, SD = 1.55) than in the Selfish
Honesty condition (M = 3.45, SD = 1.32), F(1, 119) = 8.12, p < .01.
Perceived Deception. Consistent with our manipulation, participants also
perceived their partners to be more deceptive in the Altruistic Lie condition (M = 5.37,
SD = 1.35) than in the Selfish Honesty condition (M = 2.88, SD = 1.34), F(1, 119) =
102.60, p < .001.
Discussion
Consistent with our thesis, individuals trusted altruistic liars more than honest
partners. Importantly, participants recognized that they had been deceived, but rated their
counterparts as more benevolent and thus, more trustworthy. Study 1a provides initial
evidence that deception can increase trust.
--Figure 1 about here
---Study 1b

In Study 1a, participants who were deceived directly benefitted from the
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deception. Their subsequent trust decisions may have been influenced by reciprocity. In
Study 1b, we rule out reciprocity as an alternative explanation. In Study 1b, participants
observe, rather than experience, deception. Individuals played a trust game with
counterparts who either had or had not told an altruistic lie to a different partner in a
previous interaction.
Method
Participants. We recruited 261 participants from a city in the northeastern United
States to participate in a study in exchange for a $10 show-up fee.
Procedure and Materials. In this study, we randomly assigned participants to
one of two conditions in a between-subjects design. Participants observed an individual
who either told a prosocial lie or was selfishly honest and then played a trust game with
this person.
We seated participants in separate cubicles to complete this study on the
computer. The study was titled, “Partner Exercises.” We told participants that they would
complete two separate exercises with two separate partners. The first exercise, which we
called “Exercise 1,” was a deception game. Within the experiment, we called the second
exercise, the trust game, “Exercise 2.” Both games are similar to the games we used in
Study 1a. In Study 1b, however, we matched participants with two different partners.
Participants first completed the deception game and chose Heads or Tails. We paired
participants with a new partner for the trust game. Participants did not learn about their
own outcome in the deception game until they completed the entire study.
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Manipulation of altruistic lies. We told participants that their partner in the trust

game (“Exercise 2”) had been matched with a different participant in the deception game
(“Exercise 1”) and had been assigned to the role of Sender. We then revealed the decision
the Sender had made and the information they had had prior to making that decision. As
in Study 1a, by revealing the Sender’s decision and the payments associated with their
choice, participants learned that the Sender either told an altruistic lie or was selfishly
honest.
The trust game. The trust game in Study 1b was similar to the trust game we used
in Study 1a. We assigned every participant to the role of Player 1 and we matched each
participant with a Player 2 who was the Sender in the first Exercise. In the trust game in
Study 1b, participants started with $2. If Player 1 chose to “Pass $2” the money grew to
$5. If Player 1 passed the money, Player 2 had the decision to either “Keep $5” or
“Return $2.50.” We used larger stakes in this study than those we used in Study 1a
because our participants were university students, rather than Mechanical Turk
participants.
Dependent variables. As in Study 1a, our main dependent variable was trusting
behavior, measured by the decision to pass money in the trust game. All of our other
dependent variables were identical to those we collected in Study 1a (r > .87; α’s > .80).
After participants submitted their responses, we asked two multiple-choice recall
questions, collected demographic information, and asked participants what they thought
the purpose of the study was. Participants then received bonus payment based on their
decisions.
Results
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We report the results from 257 participants (60.3% female; M age = 20 years, SD =
2.30) who passed all comprehension checks and completed the entire study; 4
participants failed a comprehension check at the start of the experiment and were
automatically eliminated from the study. We present the means and standard deviations
of each of our scales, as well as the inter-scale correlation matrix in Table 2.
Trusting behavior. Consistent with our prediction, participants were more likely
to trust their partner when they learned that their partner had told someone else an
altruistic lie (39%), than when they learned that their partner had told someone else the
truth (21%), χ2 (1, N = 257) = 9.79, p < .01. We depict these results in Figure 1.
Attitudinal Trust. As in Study 1a, our behavioral and attitudinal measures of
trust followed the same pattern and were highly correlated, r(257) = .70, p < .001.

Participants reported trusting their partners more in the Altruistic Lie condition (M = 3.51,
SD = 1.71) than in the Selfish Honesty condition (M = 2.66, SD = 1.46), F(1, 255) =
18.04, p < .01.
Perceived Benevolence. Participants also perceived their partners to be more
benevolent in the Altruistic Lie condition (M = 4.14, SD = 1.39) than in the Selfish
Honesty condition (M = 3.75, SD = 1.07), F(1, 255) = 8.12, p = .01.
Perceived Deception. Consistent with our manipulation, participants also
perceived their partners to be more deceptive in the Altruistic Lie condition (M = 4.91,
SD = 1.45) than in the Selfish Honesty condition (M = 3.40, SD = 1.64), F(1, 255) =
60.18, p < .001.
Discussion
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As in Study 1a, our participants trusted altruistic liars more than people who were
selfishly honest. In this study, participants observed rather than experienced deception.
Results from this study rule out direct reciprocity as an alternative explanation for our
findings in Study 1a. Unlike Study 1a, participants in this study did not benefit from the
act of deception.
Study 2
In Study 2, we extend our investigation by examining how different types of

prosocial lies influence trust. In Studies 1a and 1b, we investigated altruistic lies. Because
these lies were costly for the liar, it is possible that our trust results are driven in part by
the desire to compensate the liar for his altruism. We rule out this explanation in Study 2.
In Study 2, we demonstrate that our findings extend to prosocial lies that are not
characterized by altruism. We explore how non-altruistic prosocial lies, lies that help the
deceived party and have no effect on the liar, and mutually beneficial lies, lies that
benefit the deceived party and the liar, influence trust.
Method
Participants. We recruited 300 adults to participate in an online study in
exchange for payment via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Procedure and Materials. As in Study 1b, participants learned about the
decisions an individual made as a Sender in a deception game and then played a trust
game with that individual. In this study, we randomly assigned participants to one of four
experimental conditions in a 2(Deception: Lie vs. Honesty) x 2(Type of lie: Prosocial vs.
Mutually beneficial) between-subjects design. That is, participants learned the following
about a Sender in the deception game: the Sender either lied or was honest; and lying

either had no effect on the Sender and benefited the Receiver (i.e. was prosocial) or
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benefited both the Sender and the Receiver (i.e. was mutually beneficial).
In this study, participants first learned that they would play a trust game with a
partner. We referred to the trust game as “The Choice Game” in the experiment. After
participants learned about the trust game, but before they made any decisions, we told
them that they would learn more information about their partner. Participants learned that
their partner in the trust game had completed the trust game, along with another exercise,
“The Coin Flip Game,” in a previous study. “The Coin Flip Game” was the same

deception game as the one we used in Studies 1a and 1b. Participants in this study,

however, observed but did not play the deception game. That is, our participants did not
have a chance to earn money before they played the trust game.
Manipulation of prosocial lies. We told participants that their partner in the trust
game had been matched with a different participant in the deception game (“The Coin
Flip Game”) and had been randomly assigned to the role of Sender. We then explained
the deception game and revealed the Sender’s decision in that game.
In Study 2, we manipulated both the decision to lie and the type of lie that was
told. In order to manipulate the type of lie, we manipulated the payments associated with
Outcome A (Honesty) and Outcome B (Lying). When lying was prosocial, Outcome A
yielded $2 for the Sender, $0 for the Receiver and Outcome B yielded $2 for the Sender,
$1 for the Receiver. That is, this lie was prosocial, but not altruistic. When lying was
mutually beneficial, Outcome A yielded $2 for the Sender, $0 for the Receiver and
Outcome B yielded $2.25 for the Sender, $1 for the Receiver. We summarize the
payments associated with each type of lie in Table 1.

Participants learned whether the Sender had been honest or had lied in the
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deception game, and whether or not lying was prosocial or mutually beneficial. Then,
participants played the trust game with the Sender and rated the Sender.
The trust Game. We referred to the trust game as “The Choice Game” in the
experiment. The trust game we used in Study 2 was similar to the one we used in Study
1a and Study 1b. In this version of the trust game, however, participants played with
lottery tickets rather than monetary outcomes. Using lottery tickets allowed us to increase
the stakes on Mechanical Turk (a chance to win $25) and prevented participants from
directly comparing outcomes in the deception game and the trust game.
In this trust game, we assigned participants to the role of Player 1 and matched
them with the confederate Player 2 who had made decisions in “The Coin Flip Game.” In
the trust game, Player 1 started with 4 lottery tickets. If Player 1 chose to “Keep 4 lottery
tickets,” Player 1 earned 4 lottery tickets and Player 2 earned 0 lottery tickets. If Player 1
chose to “Pass 4 lottery tickets,” the number of tickets tripled to 12 tickets and Player 2
made the decision to either “Keep 12 lottery tickets” or “Return 6 lottery tickets.”
Participants knew that the more tickets they had, the more likely they were to win the $25
lottery at the end of the study.
Dependent variables. Our main dependent variable was trusting behavior,
measured by Player 1’s decision to pass the lottery tickets in the trust game. Our
measures of trusting attitudes and perceived deception were identical to those we
collected in Studies 1a and 1b (r > .93; α’s > .82). We modified our measure of perceived
benevolence to include new items that were more specific: “This person is benevolent”,
“This person would not purposefully hurt others”, “This person has good intentions” (α=

.86). We used a 7-point Likert scale anchored at 1 = “Strongly disagree” and 7 =
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“Strongly agree.”
After participants submitted their responses, we asked two multiple choice recall
questions, collected demographic information, and asked participants what they thought
the purpose of the study was. We then told participants the number of lottery tickets they
received as a result of their decision and their counterpart’s decision in the trust game.
We conducted the lottery the day the experiment ended.
Results
We report the results from 293 participants (39.9% female; M age = 32 years, SD =
11.2) who passed the comprehension checks and completed the entire study; 7
participants failed a comprehension check at the start of the experiment and were
automatically eliminated from the study. We present the means and standard deviations
of each of our scales, as well as the inter-scale correlation matrix in Table 2.
Trusting behavior. We first conducted a logistic regression on trusting behavior,
using Deception, Type of Lie, and the Deception x Type of Lie interaction as independent
variables. We found a main effect of Deception (b = .557, p < .01), such that participants
were more trusting of individuals who told lies that helped others. Specifically, 63% of
participants trusted partners who had lied, whereas only 37% of participants trusted
partners who had been honest; χ2 (1, N = 293) = 20.23, p < .01.
We found no main effect of Type of Lie and we found no significant Deception x
Type of Lie interaction (ps > .32). Although lying had a directionally larger effect on trust
when the prosocial lie was not mutually beneficial, this difference was not significant. In

25

Figure 2, we display the percentage of participants who passed money in each of our four
experimental conditions.
--Figure 2 about here
--Attitudinal Trust. As in Studies 1a and 1b, our behavioral and attitudinal
measures of trust were highly correlated, r(293) = .73, p < .001 and follow the same
pattern. A two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of Deception on attitudinal trust,
F(1,289) = 16.42, p < .001. Participants perceived their partner to be more trustworthy
when they lied (M = 3.83, SD = 1.88) than when they had told the truth (M = 2.95, SD =

1.91). We do not find a main effect of Type of Lie, F(1,289) = .13, p = .71, nor do we find
a significant Deception x Type of Lie interaction, F(1,289) = .34, p = .56.
Perceived Benevolence. A two-way ANOVA also revealed a main effect of
Deception on perceived benevolence, F(1,289) = 16.42, p < .001. Participants perceived
their partner to be more benevolent when they lied (M = 4.56, SD = 1.15) than when they
told the truth (M = 3.63, SD = 1.33).
We also found a marginally significant Deception x Type of Lie interaction,
F(1,289) = 3.28, p = .07. Lying had a greater effect on perceived benevolence when the
lie was prosocial (M lie = 4.73, SD lie = 1.22 vs. M honesty = 3.51, SD honesty = 1.37), t(138) =
5.77, p < .001; than when the lie was mutually beneficial (M lie = 4.44, SD lie = 1.08 vs.
M thonesty = 3.75, SD honesty = 1.29), t(153) = 3.43, p < .001. We do not find a main effect of
Type of Lie, F(1,289) = .03, p = .86.

Perceived Deception. Consistent with our manipulation, participants perceived
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their partners to be more deceptive when their partner had lied (M = 5.39, SD = 1.24)
than when they told the truth (M = 2.83, SD = 1.45), F(1,289) = 259.69, p < .001. We do
not find a main effect of Type of Lie, F(1,289) = .01, p = .91, nor do we find a significant
Deception x Type of Lie interaction, F(1,289) = 1.29, p = .26.
Discussion
In Study 2, we demonstrate that altruism is not a necessary condition for lies to
increase trust. Prosocial lies that are not costly for the liar and prosocial lies that benefit
the liar both increase trust. These results suggest that trusting behavior does not simply
reflect a desire to compensate a liar for altruism. Rather, individuals trust people who
help others, even when that help involves deception and when that help is self-serving.
Although mutually beneficial lies are a weaker signal of benevolence than
prosocial lies that do not benefit the deceiver, the self-serving nature of these lies did not
undermine trust. These results suggest that for trust, judgments of benevolence may be
more important than selflessness.
Study 3
Our initial studies demonstrate that prosocial lies can increase trust. In Studies 3a
and 3b, we extend our investigation by independently manipulating deception and
intentions (Study 3a) and by including two control conditions to disentangle the effects of
selfishness from prosociality (Study 3b).
Study 3a
Method
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Participants. We recruited 337 participants from a city in the northeastern United
States to participate in a study in exchange for a $10 show-up fee.
Procedure and Materials. We seated participants in separate cubicles to
complete the study on the computer. The study was titled, “Partner Exercise.” As in
Study 2, participants learned about the decision a Sender made in a deception game and
then played a trust game with that Sender. In Study 3a, we randomly assigned
participants to one of four experimental conditions in a 2(Deception: Lie vs. Honesty) x
2(Intentions: Altruistic vs. Selfish) between-subjects design. Specifically, participants
observed a Sender who either lied or sent an honest message in a deception game, and
whose choice was either altruistic or selfish. Participants then played a trust game with
this partner.
Manipulation of lies. The deception game in Study 3a was similar to the one we
used in our prior studies. In this game, however, we used a random number generator
rather than a coin flip to begin the game. The game was otherwise identical to the game
we used in Study 2. That is, the payoffs for each pair of participants (one Sender and one
Receiver) were determined by the outcome of a random number generator and the
choices made by the Sender and the Receiver. Senders knew the correct number was 4,
and could send an honest message (e.g., “The number is 4”) or a dishonest message (e.g.,
“The number is 5”). We used a random number generator rather than a coin flip so that
participants would be less likely to make strategic inferences about the message the
Sender sent (e.g., The Sender sent the message: “The coin landed on heads”, hoping their
partner would pick “tails”).

Importantly, Senders in this experiment played The Number Game with one of
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two possible payment structures. These payment structures enabled us to manipulate
whether deception or honesty was associated with selfish or altruistic intentions.
The first payment structure was identical to the one we used in Studies 1a and 1b.
This payment structure represented the choice between selfish honesty (Option A) and
altruistic lying (Option B). In the second payment structure, we reversed the payoffs. This
payment structure represented the choice between altruistic honesty and selfish lying.
After learning about the Sender’s choice in the deception game, participants
played a trust game with the Sender. We ran a pilot study with a non-overlapping sample
(N=41) to generate decisions with which to match the decisions participants made in
Study 3a.
The Trust Game. We referred to the trust game as “The Choice Game” in the
experiment. “The Choice Game” was identical to the trust game we used in Study 1b.
Participants had the choice to either “Keep $2” or trust their partner and “Pass $2.”
Dependent variables.
As in Studies 1a, 1b, and 2, our main dependent variable was trusting behavior,
measured by the decision to pass money in the trust game. Our measures of attitudinal
trust and benevolence were identical to the measures we used in Study 2 (r’s > .86, α
=.91). We made a slight revision to our measure of perceived deception to fit the new
version of the deception game. Specifically, we asked participants to indicate their
agreement with the following statements: “This person sent an honest message about the
number chosen by the random number generator as a Sender in The Number Game,” and

“This person lied about the number chosen by the random number generator in The
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Number Game;” (r(312) = .86).
After participants submitted their responses, we asked two recall questions,
collected demographic information and asked participants what they thought the purpose
of the study was. Participants received bonus payment based upon their decisions in the
trust game before they were dismissed.
Results
We report the results from 312 participants (62.8% female; Mage= 21 years, SD =
2.50) who passed all comprehension checks and completed the entire study; 25
participants failed a comprehension check at the start of the experiment and were
automatically eliminated from the study. We present the means and standard deviations
of each of our scales, as well as the inter-scale correlation matrix in Table 2.
Passing in the trust game. We first conducted a logistic regression on trusting
behavior, using Deception, Intentions, and the Deception x Intentions interaction as
independent variables. We found a main effect of Intentions (b = .498, p < .01), such that
participants were more trusting of individuals who made altruistic decisions. Specifically,
47% of participants trusted their partners in the Altruistic conditions, whereas only 25%
of participants trusted their partners in the Selfish conditions,χ2 (1, N = 312) = 16.70, p <
.01. We found no main effect of Deception and we found no significant Deception x
Intentions interaction (ps > .79). In Figure 3, we display the percentage of participants
who passed money in each of the four experimental conditions (Altruistic Lie, Selfish Lie,
Altruistic Honesty, and Selfish Honesty).
---

Figure 3 about here
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--Attitudinal Trust. As in our previous studies, our behavioral and attitudinal
measures of trust were highly correlated, r(312) = .72, p < .001. A two-way ANOVA
revealed a main effect of Intentions, F(1,308) = 78.74, p < .001, and Deception, F(1,308)
= 5.58, p = .02, on attitudinal trust. Participants trusted their partners more in the
Altruistic conditions (M = 4.07, SD = 1.79) than they did in the Selfish conditions (M =
2.43, SD = 1.49) and they trusted their partner more in the Honesty conditions (M = 3.46,
SD = 1.82) than in the Lie conditions (M = 3.05, SD = 1.85). Although lying did not
significantly influence behavioral trust, it did influence attitudinal trust. We find no
significant interaction between Deception x Intentions, F(1,308) = .19, p = .66.
Perceived Benevolence. A two-way ANOVA revealed a main effect of
Intentions, F(1,308) = 108.70, p < .001, and Deception, F(1,308) = 18.90, p < .01, on
perceived benevolence. Participants perceived their partner to be more benevolent in the
Altruistic conditions (M = 4.82, SD = 1.22) than in the Selfish conditions (M = 3.42, SD =
1.21) and to be more benevolent in the Honesty conditions (M = 4.36, SD = 1.27) than in
the Lie conditions (M = 3.89, SD = 1.49). We find no significant interaction between
Deception x Intentions, F(1,308) = .76, p = .36.
Perceived Deception. Consistent with our manipulation, participants also
perceived their partner to be more deceptive in the Lie conditions (M = 6.06, SD = 1.30)
than in the Honesty conditions (M = 2.06, SD = 1.41), F(1,255) = 680.02, p < .001. We
find no effect of Intentions, F(1,308) = 1.54, p = .22, and we find no significant
Deception x Intentions interaction, F(1,308) = .28, p = .59.

Mediation Analyses.
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We conducted a moderated mediation analysis using the bootstrap procedure
(Hayes, 2013; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) to test the process by which lying and
intentions influence trusting behavior.
We predicted that altruistic (and selfish) intentions would influence trusting
behavior, regardless of whether the target lied, and that this would be mediated by
perceived benevolence. Our mediation model included Intentions as the independent
variable, Deception as the moderator variable, Perceived Benevolence and Perceived
Deception as the mediator variables, and Trusting Behavior as the dependent measure.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that Perceived Benevolence mediates in the
expected direction in both the Lie conditions (Indirect Effect = 1.14, SE = .25; 95% CI
[0.70, 1.67]), and the Honesty conditions (Indirect Effect = .97, SE = .23; 95% CI [0.58,
1.44]), and Perceived Deception does not mediate (both confidence intervals for the
indirect effect include zero). These results are unchanged when we use Attitudinal Trust,
rather than Trusting Behavior, as the dependent measure. Taken together, these results
indicate that perceived benevolence, and not perceived deception, influences trust. That
is, deception does not harm trust; selfishness does. We present additional regression
analyses in Table 3.
Discussion
In Study 3a, Altruistic individuals were trusted far more than selfish individuals,
and this was true whether or not the counterpart’s claims were honest or deceptive.
Controlling for intentions, we find no direct effect of lying on trusting behavior in either
study. This is true even though lying is perceived as deceptive. We use moderated

mediation analysis and confirm that perceived benevolence is the primary mechanism
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linking prosocial lying with increased trust. Interestingly, trust built on perceived
benevolence is not diminished by dishonest acts.

Study 3b
In Study 3b, we extend our investigation by including two control conditions in
our experiment. By including control conditions, we can disentangle the beneficial effects
of altruistic behavior from the harmful effects of selfish behavior. In our control
conditions, participants did not learn about the Sender’s decision in the deception game.
Method
Participants. For our 12 cell design, we recruited 1000 participants to participate
in an online study in exchange for payment via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Procedure and Materials. Study 3b was similar to Study 3a, with three notable
changes. First, we added two control conditions to disentangle the effects of altruism in
increasing trust from the effects of selfishness in decreasing trust. In the control
conditions, participants did not learn about the Sender’s decision in the deception game.
Second, for simplicity and ease of comprehension we used the Coin Flip game
rather than the Number Game for our manipulation of deception. Third, we
counterbalanced the order of our behavioral trust measure and our attitudinal trust
measure.
In Study 3b, we randomly assigned participants to one of twelve experimental
conditions in a 2(Payment Structure: Altruistic Lying-Selfish Honesty vs. Selfish LyingAltruistic Honesty) x 3(Intentions: Altruistic, Selfish, Control) x 2(Order of measures:

behavior first vs. attitudes first) between-subjects design. Participants learned that the
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Coin Flip Game had one of two possible payment structures. As in Study 3a, these
payment structures enabled us to manipulate whether deception or honesty was
associated with selfish or altruistic intentions. The payment structures were identical to
those we used in Study 3a. The first payment structure reflected the choice between
Altruistic Lying and Selfish Honesty, and the second payment structure reflected the
choice between Selfish Lying and Altruistic Honesty.
Therefore, participants learned that the Sender either made the Altruistic decision
(which was associated with Lying or Honesty), made the Selfish decision (which was
associated with Lying or Honesty), or participants did not learn the Sender’s decision (the
control conditions). Half of the participants in the control condition learned that the Coin
Flip Game reflected the choice between altruistic lying and selfish honesty (the first
payment structure) and half learned that the Coin Flip Game reflected the choice between
selfish lying and altruistic honesty (the second payment structure). In both control
conditions, participants did not learn the Sender’s choice.
We refer to these six experimental conditions as Altruistic Lie, Selfish Lie,
Altruistic Honesty, Selfish Honesty, Control 1 (learned about the Altruistic Lie-Selfish
Honesty payment structure, but did not learn about the Sender’s choice), and Control 2
(learned about the Selfish Lie-Altruistic Honesty payment structure, but did not learn
about the Sender’s choice).
After participants learned about the Coin Flip Game [and the Sender’s decision],
participants played a trust game with the Sender.

The Trust Game. We referred to the trust game as “The Choice Game” in the
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experiment. “The Choice Game” was similar to the trust games we used in our previous
studies. Participants had the choice to either “Keep $1” or trust their partner and “Pass
$1” in the trust game. If participants passed $1, the amount grew to $2.50 and their
partner had the opportunity to keep $2.50 or return half ($1.25).
As in our previous studies, participants had to pass a comprehension check to
complete the study.
Dependent variables.
Our primary dependent variable was trusting behavior, measured by the decision
to pass money in the trust game. Our measures of attitudinal trust, benevolence, and
deception were identical to the measures we used in Study 3a (r = .93, α’s > .88).
However, we did not measure perceived deception in the control conditions because
participants did not have any information about whether or not the Sender had deceived
their partner.
After participants submitted their responses, we collected demographic
information and asked participants what they thought the purpose of the study was. We
paid participants a bonus payment based upon their outcome in the trust game before we
dismissed them.
Results
We report the results from 974 participants (40.2% female; Mage= 31 years, SD =
10.36) who passed the comprehension checks and completed the entire study; 26
participants failed the comprehension check at the start of the experiment and were
automatically eliminated from the study. None of our main results are affected by
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question order, and we present our analyses collapsed across this factor. We present the

means and standard deviations of each of our scales, as well as the inter-scale correlation
matrix in Table 2.
Passing in the trust game. We first conducted a logistic regression on trusting
behavior, using Payment Structure, Intentions, and the Payment Structure x Intentions
interaction as independent variables. We found a main effect of Intentions, (b = .938, p <
.001); participants were significantly more likely to pass money in the trust game in the
Altruistic conditions (69%) than in the Control conditions (47%); χ2 (1, N = 654) =
32.10, p < .01, and in the Selfish conditions (25%), χ2 (1, N = 650) = 121.43, p < .01.
Participants were also significantly more likely to trust their partner in the Control
conditions than they were in the Selfish conditions, χ2 (1, N = 644) = 32.53, p < .01.
We found no effects of Payment Structure, nor did we find a significant Intentions
x Payment Structure interaction (ps > .86). In Figure 4, we display the percentage of
participants who passed money in each of the six experimental conditions.
--Figure 4 about here
--Attitudinal Trust. As in our previous studies, behavioral and attitudinal measures
of trust were highly correlated, r(974) = .71, p < .001, and followed a similar pattern. A
two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Intentions, F(2,968) = 240.74, p <
.001, such that participants trusted their partners more in the Altruistic conditions (M =
4.70, SD = 1.61) than the Control conditions (M = 3.22, SD = 1.78), t(653) = 11.86, p <
.001; and the Selfish conditions (M = 1.96, SD = 1.37), t(649) = 21.94, p < .001.
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Participants were also more trusting of their partner in the Control conditions than in the
Selfish conditions, t(643) = 10.00, p < .001.
We found no main effect of Payment Structure, F(1, 968) = 0.25, p = .62. There

was, however, a significant Intentions x Payment Structure interaction, F(2, 968) = 4.30,
p < .05. Participants trusted individuals who told selfish lies (M = 1.73, SD = 1.09)
significantly less than individuals who were selfishly honest (M = 2.18, SD = 1.56),
t(319) = 2.54, p = .01, but we found no difference in trust between individuals who told
altruistic lies (M = 4.68, SD = 1.64) and individuals who were altruistically honest (M =
4.71, SD = 1.58), t(329) = 0.17, p = .87. We also found no difference in trust between the
two control conditions (M = 3.08, SD = 1.66 vs. M = 3.35, SD = 1.89), t(323) = 1.53, p =
.13. These results suggest that deception in the service of altruism does not undermine
trust, but that deception in the service of selfishness does harm trust.
Perceived Benevolence. Perceived benevolence followed the same pattern as
attitudinal trust. A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of Intentions,
F(2,968) = 377.80, p < .001, such that participants perceived their partner to be more
benevolent in the Altruistic conditions (M = 5.20, SD = 1.01) than they did in the Control
conditions (M 4.29, SD = 0.98), t(653) = 11.18, p < .001, and the Selfish conditions (M =
2.98, SD = 1.20), t(649) = 27.24, p < .001. Participants also rated their partners as more
benevolent in the Control conditions than they did in the Selfish conditions, t(643) =
16.20, p < .001.
We also found a main effect of Payment Structure, F(1, 968) = 20.01, p < .001;
partners who faced the opportunity to tell altruistic lies were perceived to be more
benevolent (M = 4.30, SD = 1.32) than were partners who faced the opportunity to tell
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selfish lies (M = 4.04, SD = 1.47). This effect was qualified by a significant Intensions x
Payment Structure interaction, F(2, 968) = 17.03, p < .001. Participants rated partners
who told selfish lies (M = 2.54, SD = 1.02) to be significantly less benevolent than

partners who were selfishly honest (M = 3.39, SD = 1.22), t(319) = 7.28, p < .001, but we
found no difference in perceived benevolence between partners who told altruistic lies (M
= 5.25, SD = 1.07) and partners who were altruistically honest (M = 5.15, SD = 0.94),
t(329) = 0.91, p = .36. In other words, selfish deception was perceived to be particularly
malevolent. There was no difference in perceived benevolence between the two control
conditions (M = 4.27, SD = 0.92 vs. M = 4.32, SD = 1.04), t(323) = 0.46, p = .65.
Perceived Deception. Consistent with our manipulation, a two-way ANOVA
revealed a significant Intentions x Payment Structure interaction, F(1, 645) = 1611.15, p
< .001, such that altruistic lies were perceived to be more deceptive (M = 5.17, SD =
1.33) than selfish honesty (M = 2.77, SD = 1.53), t(324) = 18.46, p < .001, and selfish
lying was perceived to be more deceptive (M = 6.47, SD = 0.88) than altruistic honesty
(M = 1.51, SD = 0.76), t(323) = 38.15, p = .001.
We also found a main effect of Intentions, F(1, 645) = 195.15, p < .001, such that
selfishness was perceived to be more deceptive (M = 4.57, SD = 1.07) than altruism (M =
3.29, SD = 2.13). In other words, the same lie was perceived to be more deceptive when it
was associated with selfish, rather than altruistic, intentions. We found no main effect of
Payment Structure, F(1, 645) = 0.08, p = .78.
Discussion
In Study 3a, we demonstrate that deception itself has no effect on benevolencebased trust. In Study 3b, we include control conditions and document both a penalty for

selfishness and a benefit for altruism. Selfish intentions, whether they were associated
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with honesty or deception, harmed trust; altruistic intentions, whether they were
associated with honesty or deception, increased trust.
Although we find no differences between altruistic lies and altruistic honesty, in
Study 3b, we do find that selfish lies are penalized relative to selfish honesty. Individuals
may perceive honesty as the default decision, whereas lying may reflect a willful
departure that is more diagnostic of intentionality. In this case, lying to reap selfish
benefits may convey a stronger signal of malevolent intentions than honesty that yields
the same outcome.

Study 4
In our previous studies, we demonstrate that prosocial lies can increase trust. We
measure trust using the trust game, and conceptualized trust as the willingness to be
vulnerable to another person when there is an opportunity for exploitation. In Study 3a
we demonstrate that trust behavior and attitudes are mediated by perceptions of
benevolence and are largely unaffected by deception. In other words, prosocial deception
increases benevolence-based trust.
Benevolence-based trust is important in close relationships (e.g., Kim et al., 2006)
and likely influences behaviors such as the decision to loan money or property to another
person, the decision to rely on someone for emotional support, or the decision to share
sensitive information with someone (e.g., McAllister, 1995; Currall & Judge, 1995;
Glaeser et al., 2000; Levin & Cross, 2004). However, there are many other types of trust
that pervade our social interactions. The people we trust to be kind may not be the same

people we trust to avoid temptation and act with integrity. In Study 4, we demonstrate
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how prosocial lies influence different types of trust. Specifically, we explore how
prosocial lies influence integrity-based trust.
Integrity-based trust reflects the belief that the trustee adheres to a set of
acceptable ethical principles, such as honesty and truthfulness (Butler & Cantrell, 1984;
Mayer et al., 1995; Kim et al., 2004). Integrity may be particularly important when trust
decisions hinge on issues of veracity. For example, in some cases individuals need to rely
on information or advice. In these cases, integrity may matter more than benevolence and
prosocial lies will decrease trust. In Study 4 we demonstrate that prosocial lies increase
benevolence-based trust, but harm integrity-based trust.
Pilot Study
We introduce a new trust game, the Rely-or-Verify game, to capture integritybased trust. We report results from a pilot study to demonstrate that decisions within the
game corresponded with integrity-based trust.
The Rely-or-Verify Game. We designed the Rely-or-Verify game to parallel the
decision to trust a counterpart’s claim. For example, an employer faces the decision of
whether or not to trust a prospective employee’s claim about their work experience. The
employer could either trust the prospective employee’s claim or verify the claim, at a
cost. Similarly, negotiators, relational partners, and parents can either trust or verify the
claims their counterparts make.
The following features characterize the Rely-or-Verify game: First, the trustee
derives a benefit from successful deception (e.g., by over-stating prior work experience).
Second, the truster cannot distinguish deception from honesty without verifying a claim.
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Third, for the truster, relying on the trustee’s claim is risky, and fourth, verifying a claim

is costly. The decision to rely on a potential trustee’s information reflects the willingness
to be vulnerable predicated upon honesty. This decision operationalizes Rotter’s (1971: p.
444) original definition of trust: “a generalized expectancy…that the word, promise,
verbal, or written statement of another individual or group can be relied on.” In contrast
to passing money in the trust game, which depends on perceived benevolence, the
decision to rely on a counterpart’s claim in Rely-or-Verify depends on perceptions of the
counterpart’s reputation for honesty and truth (Butler & Cantrell, 1984). That is, this
decision reflects integrity-based trust.
In Rely-or-Verify, Player 1 (the trustee) makes a claim that is either accurate or
inaccurate. Player 2 observes the claim and decides to either Rely (trust) or Verify (not
trust) the claim. If Player 1’s claim is inaccurate and Player 2 relies on the claim, Player
1 earns a 1 and Player 2 earns a 2 . If Player 1’s claim is inaccurate and Player 2 verifies
it, Player 1 earns b 1 and Player 2 earns b 2 . If Player 1’s claim is accurate and Player 2
relies on it, Player 1 earns c 1 and Player 2 earns c 2 . If Player 1’s claim is accurate and
Player 2 verifies it, Player 1 earns d 1 and Player 2 earns d 2 .
The payoffs for Player 1 are structured such that a 1 > c 1 ≥ d 1 > b 1. For Player 1,
deception is risky; for Player 1, deception yields the highest payoff if Player 2 relies on
the deceptive claim, but it yields the lowest payoff if Player 2 verifies the deceptive
claim.
The payoffs for Player 2 are structured such that c 2 > d 2

≥

b 2 > a 2. In other words,

Player 2 earns the highest payoff by relying on accurate information and the lowest
payoff by relying on inaccurate information. Verification is costly, but minimizes risk.

By verifying information, Player 2 learns the truth. Thus, verification yields the same
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outcome for Player 2, regardless of whether or not Player 1 told the truth. We depict the
general form of Rely-or-Verify in Figure 5.
--Figure 5 about here
--In our experiment, we term Player 1 the “Red Player” and Player 2 the “Blue
Player.” The Red Player sends a message to the Blue Player. In this case, the Red Player
had to report whether or not the amount of money in a jar of coins was odd or even. The
Blue Player received this message and could either Rely on the message or Verify the
message. We provide the full instructions and the exact game we used in Appendix A.
Participants. We recruited 198 participants from a city in the northeastern United
States to participate in a pilot study of Rely-or-Verify in exchange for a $10 show-up fee.
Method. Participants in the pilot study read the full instructions of the Rely-orVerify game (see Appendix A) and were assigned to the role of the “Blue Player.”
Participants had to pass a comprehension check in order to complete the entire study.
Participants who failed the comprehension check twice were automatically removed from
the experiment.
Participants who passed the comprehension check received a message from a
confederate “Red Player,” informing them that the amount of money in the jar was either
odd or even. The decision to “Rely” represents our behavioral measure of integrity-based
trust.

After participants made a decision to Rely or Verify, they rated how much they
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trusted their partner, and rated their partner’s benevolence and integrity. We measured
trusting attitudes using three items (α = .84): “I trust my partner,” “I am willing to make
myself vulnerable to my partner,” and “I am confident that my partner sent me an
accurate message;” 1 = “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree.” We measured
perceived benevolence using the same scale we used in Studies 3a and 3b (α = .78), and
we measured perceived integrity using three items (α = .66): “This person has a great
deal of integrity,” “I can trust this person’s word,” and “This person cares about honesty
and truth;” 1= “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree.”
After participants made Rely-or-Verify decisions and rated their partner, they
answered demographic questions, were paid, and dismissed.
Results. Nearly all of the participants (98%) passed the comprehension check and
completed the entire study. A total of 31.3% of participants chose “Rely” and trusted
their partner. We did not identify any gender differences in behavior.
Importantly, the decision to “Rely” was closely related to perceptions of
trustworthiness, r(194) = .71, p < .001. Trusting behavior in Rely-or-Verify was
correlated with both perceived benevolence, r(194) = .48, p < .001, and perceived
integrity r(194) = .52, p < .001. That is, the decision to trust a target’s claim, rather than
verify it, reflects the belief that the target would not purposefully hurt others
(benevolence) and the belief that the target cares about honesty and truth (integrity).
Main Study
In our main study, participants learned about a counterpart who had either told
prosocial lies or who had been honest in a series of prior interactions. After learning this
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information, participants played either the Trust Game or the Rely-or-Verify game with
the counterpart.
Method
Participants. We recruited 500 participants to participate in an online study in
exchange for payment via Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Procedure and Materials. Participants in Study 4 learned about a series of
decisions a confederate counterpart made as a Sender in the Coin Flip Game. This was
the same Coin Flip Game we used in Studies 1a, 1b, 2, and 3b. Participants then played
either the Trust Game or the Rely-or-Verify game with this counterpart. We randomly

assigned participants to one of four cells from a 2(Deception: Prosocial lie vs. Honesty) x
2(Game: Trust Game vs. Rely-or-Verify) between-subjects design.
In Study 4, participants learned that the Sender had played the Coin Flip Game
four times with four different partners. We altered the payoffs associated with deception
in each of the four rounds of the game so that we could include both altruistic and
mutually beneficial lies in a single manipulation. By using repeated behavior to
manipulate prosocial deception, we strengthened our manipulation. This manipulation
made it clear that the Sender was either committed to honesty (telling the truth even when
it was costly) or to benevolence (helping the Receiver even when it was costly).
Participants learned about four decisions the Sender had made in four rounds of
The Coin Flip Game. In rounds 1 and 3, the Sender faced the choice between an altruistic
lie and selfish honesty. In rounds 2 and 4, the Sender faced the choice between a mutually
beneficial lie and mutually harmful honesty. Participants learned that the Sender made
one of the following two profiles of decisions: Prosocial Lies {Altruistic lie, mutually

beneficial lie, altruistic lie, mutually beneficial lie} or Honesty {Selfish truth, mutually
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harmful truth, selfish truth, mutually harmful truth}. We include the payoffs associated
with each choice in Table 4.
After participants learned about the Sender’s four decisions, participants played
either the trust game or the Rely-or-Verify game with the Sender. The Trust Game we
used was identical to the version of the trust game we used in Study 3b. The version of
the Rely-or-Verify game we used was identical to the version we used in the pilot study.
Dependent variables.
Our main dependent variable was trusting behavior, measured by the decision to
pass money in the trust game or “Rely” in the Rely-or-Verify game. Our measures of
attitudinal trust for Rely-or-Verify were identical to the measures we used in the pilot
study. We adapted the wording of these items to create a parallel measure of attitudinal
trust for the trust game (α= .92). We provide all items and anchors in Appendix B.
We measured perceived deception, using the same measures we used in our
previous studies (α = .94). We measured perceived benevolence as we did before, but to
be sure to distinguish benevolence from integrity, we eliminated the item, “This person
has good intentions;” r(457) = .72, p < .001.
After participants submitted their responses, we asked a recall question, collected
demographic information and asked participants what they thought the purpose of the
study was. The next day, we followed up with participants to pay them a bonus payment
based on their decisions in our study.
Results

We report results from 457 participants (31.6% female; M age = 31 years, SD =
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9.87) who passed all comprehension checks and completed the entire study; 43
participants failed the comprehension check and were automatically removed from the
study. We present the means and standard deviations of each of our scales, as well as the
inter-scale correlation matrix in Table 5.
Trusting behavior. We first conducted a logistic regression on trusting behavior
using Deception, Game, and the Deception x Game interaction as independent variables.
Importantly, we found a significant Lying x Game interaction; b = .37, p < .01. In the
trust game, participants were more likely to pass money to their partners in the Prosocial
Lie condition (57%) than in the Honesty condition (40%), χ2 (1, N = 262) = 7.41, p <
.01. We find the opposite pattern of results in the Rely-or-Verify game; participants
playing Rely-or-Verify were less likely to rely on their partners in the Prosocial Lie
condition (37%) than in the Honesty condition (57%); χ2 (1, N = 195) = 7.75, p < .01. In
other words, prosocial lying increased benevolence-based trust and harmed integritybased trust. We found no main effect of Deception or Game (ps > .73). We depict these
results in Figure 6.
--Figure 6 about here
--Attitudinal Trust. Our attitudinal trust measures parallel our behavioral trust
results. We find that trusting attitudes were highly correlated with trusting behavior in
both games, each r ≥ .80 (see Table 5).

A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant Deception x Game interaction,
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F(1,453) = 17.57, p < .001, such that prosocial lying increased trusting attitudes in the
Trust Game, but decreased trusting attitudes in the Rely-or-Verify game.
Specifically, participants trusted the prosocial liar more than the honest individual
in the Trust Game conditions (M = 4.11, SD = 2.08 vs. M = 3.54, SD = 1.86), t(261) =
2.48, p = .014, but trusted the prosocial liar less than the honest individual in the Rely-orVerify conditions (M = 3.57, SD = 1.79 vs. M = 4.46, SD = 1.56), t(194) = 3.38, p < .01.
We did not find a significant main effect of Deception, F(1,453) = 1.21, p = .27, or
Game, F(1,453) = .89, p = .34.
Perceived Benevolence. Ratings of perceived benevolence followed a similar
pattern. A two-way ANOVA revealed a significant Deception x Game interaction,
F(1,453) = 5.93, p = .015, but no main effect of Deception, F(1,453) = 1.89, p = .17, or
Game, F(1,453) = .15, p = .70. Specifically, participants judged the prosocial liar to be
more benevolent than the honest individual in the Trust Game conditions (M = 4.72, SD =
1.74 vs. M = 4.16, SD = 1.53), t(261) = 2.92, p < .01, but there was no difference between
the prosocial liar and the honest individual in the Rely-or-Verify conditions (M = 4.30, SD
= 1.51 vs. M = 4.46, SD = 1.32), t(194) = 0.70, p = .48. It is possible that individuals did
not rate the prosocial liar as more benevolent in the Rely-or-Verify game because their
ratings were influenced by their prior trust decisions.
Perceived Deception. As expected, individuals who told prosocial lies were
perceived to be more deceptive (M = 5.81, SD = 1.17) than individuals who were honest
(M = 1.75, SD = 1.11), F(1, 453) = 1393.2, p < .001. We did not find a main effect of
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Game, F(1,453) = .60, p = .44, or a significant Deception x Game interaction, F(1,453) =
.04, p = .84.
Discussion
In our prior studies, we documented the beneficial effects of prosocial lies on
trust. In Study 4, we use a repeated deception game and demonstrate that prosocial lies
increase benevolence-based trust, but harm integrity-based trust. That is, we reveal that
prosocial lies are not universally beneficial; prosocial lies affect different types of trust
differently.
To measure different types of trust, we introduce a new tool. The prevailing
behavioral measure of trust, the trust game, reflects benevolence-based trust. We
introduce the Rely-or-Verify game to measure integrity-based trust.
General Discussion

Across four studies, we demonstrate that lying can increase trust. In particular, we
find that prosocial lies, false statements told with the intention of benefitting others,
increase benevolence-based trust. In Study 1a, participants trusted counterparts more
when the counterpart told them an altruistic lie than when the counterpart told the truth.
In Study 1b, we replicate our result and rule out direct reciprocity as an alternative
mechanism. In this study, participants observed, rather than experienced deception.
In Studies 2, 3a, and 3b, we examine different types of lies. We find that
participants trusted individuals who told non-altruistic, prosocial lies and mutually
beneficial lies more than individuals who told truths that harmed others. Our findings
reveal that benevolence, demonstrating concern for others, is far more important for
fostering some types of trust, than either honesty or selflessness. In fact, we find that

deception per se, does surprisingly little to undermine trust in the trust game. We
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disentangle the beneficial effects of benevolence from the harmful effects of selfishness
and find that compared to a control condition, benevolence boosts trust and selfishness
harms trust.
In Study 4, we investigate how prosocial lying influences distinct types of trust.
The trust game reflects benevolence-based trust, and we introduce a new game, the Relyor-Verify game to capture integrity-based trust. We demonstrate that prosocial lying
increases benevolence-based trust, but undermines integrity-based trust. That is, prosocial
lies do not always benefit trust; the same actions can have divergent effects on
benevolence-based and integrity-based trust.
Contributions and Implications
Our findings demonstrate that the relationship between deception and trust is far
more complicated than prior work has assumed. Lying, per se, does not always harm
trust.
In prior work, deception has been unfairly disparaged because scholars have
conflated deception with self-serving intentions. We find that although deception can
exacerbate the negative inferences associated with selfish actions, deception does not
undermine the positive inferences associated with prosocial actions.
Our research contributes to the deception and trust literatures in three ways. First,
we highlight the importance of studying a broader range of deceptive behaviors.
Prosocial lying is pervasive, but we know surprisingly little about the interpersonal
consequences of prosocial lies. Although most research assumes that deception is

49

harmful, we document potential benefits of deception. Prosocial lies signal benevolence
and can increase trust.
Second, we provide insight into the antecedents of trust. Trust scholars have
assumed that both integrity and benevolence are antecedents of trust, yet little research
investigates when each of these values matters. Our research suggests that benevolence
may be the primary concern for many trust decisions. We are the first to independently
manipulate benevolence and honesty in this context and draw causal inferences about
how they each impact trust.
Third, we demonstrate that identical actions can have divergent effects on
different trust decisions. Scholars have used the term “trust” to refer to a broad range of
behaviors. For example, trust has been used to describe the willingness to hire someone
(Kim et al., 2004), to give someone responsibility without oversight (Kim et al., 2004;
Mayer & Davis, 1999), to rely on someone’s word (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982;
Rotter, 1971), and to expose oneself to financial risk (Berg et al., 1995; Pillutla et al.,
2003; Schweitzer et al., 2006; McCabe et al., 2003; Glaeser et al., 2000; Malhotra &
Murninghan, 2002; Malhotra, 2004). Our findings suggest that different types of trust
may guide these decisions, and the same information may influence these decisions in
different ways.

Our research has both methodological and managerial implications. We introduce
a new tool that researchers can use to capture the central elements of trusting acts. The
Rely-or-Verify game is similar to the trust game, but it offers distinct advantages. First,
the Rely-or-Verify game reflects perceptions of both benevolence and integrity, rather
than benevolence alone. Second, in contrast with the trust game, the truster in the Rely-
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or-Verify game moves second. That is, in contrast to Player 1’s decision in the trust game
(who might pass to engender reciprocity; Chou, Halevy, & Murnighan, 2011), there is no
strategic signal in Player 2’s decision to trust in Rely-or-Verify. In addition, because trust
in the Rely-or-Verify game is not characterized by the decision to share money, trust
decisions in the Rely-or-Verify game are also unlikely to reflect social preferences for
fairness or altruism, a concern that scholars have raised about the trust game (e.g., Ashraf
et al., 2006).
Prescriptively, our findings suggest that we should reconsider how we
characterize deception. Parents, leaders and politicians often publicly and emphatically
denounce lying—even though they often engage in it (Nyberg, 1993; Heyman, Luu, Lee,
2009; Grover, 2005). Acknowledging the benefits of prosocial lies could free individuals
of this hypocrisy. In fact, authority figures could explicitly embrace certain types of
deception and teach others when and how to lie. This would reflect a stark contrast to the
current practice of asserting that lying is universally wrong, while modeling that it is
often right.
Managers should also consider if honesty is always the best policy. Honesty,
although often considered a virtue, in some cases may be selfish and mean-spirited. In
many conversations, individuals make a trade-off between being honest and being kind.
In order for employees to engender trust, benevolence may be far more important than
honesty.
Limitations and Future Directions
In our studies, we experimentally manipulated behavior in the deception game,

which afforded us experimental control. By altering the monetary payoffs associated with

honesty and lies, we were able to send unambiguous signals about the intentions
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associated with each lie. This enables us to draw causal inferences about how prosocial
intentions and deception differentially influence distinct forms of trust.
However, many prosocial lies are characterized by features that we did not
capture in our experiments. For example, we study lies that generated monetary gains.
Although some lies generate monetary outcomes, many lies, and prosocial lies in
particular, are motivated by the desire to protect people’s feelings (DePaulo, 1992).
These lies may be perceived to be more innocuous and be more likely to foster emotional
security, an important component of trust in close relationships (Rempel et al., 1985).
Furthermore, lies told to avoid losses may be perceived to be more benevolent than lies
told to accrue gains. Avoiding a loss is often much more psychologically powerful than
generating a gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and thus, deceived parties may be
particularly grateful to be the beneficiaries of these types of lies.
In our study, the motives and outcomes associated with deception were clear.
However, in practice, both motives and the link between acts and outcomes may be
difficult to gauge. In some cases, people attribute selfish motives to prosocial acts
(Critcher & Dunning, 2011; Fein, 1996; Newman & Cain, 2014; Miller, 1999; Lin-Healy
& Small, 2013). This may be particularly true for prosocial acts that violate other moral
principles, such as the principle of honesty. Although participants in our studies were not
distrusting of individuals who told lies to help themselves and others, it is possible that if
the selfish gains associated with mutually beneficial lies were sufficiently large,
observers would discount the liar’s prosociality.
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There are likely contexts, however, in which lies told with good intentions are not
perceived to be benevolent. For example, Wang and Murnighan (2013) found that some
lies that help others – such as lying to a patient about a medication – are perceived to be
less benevolent than honesty, and consequently, harm trust. We expect that the extent to
which a lie is perceived as benevolent is immensely important. Future research should
explore when and why favorable attributions are made for ethically ambivalent actions.
Quite possibly, many factors that we did not explore will moderate the
relationship between prosocial deception and trust. For example, the stage of a
relationship may matter. In early stages of relationship development, emotional security
may be a primary concern, and prosocial lying may be particularly beneficial. In late
stages of relationships, honesty may be a stronger signal of intimacy than kindness.
Perhaps as relationships develop, the role of prosocial lying will change. It is also
possible that prosocial lies have detrimental long-term consequences. If an individual
develops a reputation for dishonesty, prosocial lies may become less credible. Future
work should explore trust as a dynamic construct (Lewicki et al., 2006; Schoorman,
Mayer, & Davis, 2007; Schweitzer et al., 2006).
It is possible that our attitudes towards deception do not reflect intrinsic
preferences for honesty and truth, but instead reflect our expectations of different
relational partners. We may expect people in some roles to support and help us, but
expect others to be objective and provide us with accurate information. Understanding
how the nature of trust differs across relationships is an important next step for trust
research.
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Gender and power may also influence our preferences for honesty and kindness.
For example, women tell more prosocial lies than men (Erat & Gneezy, 2012) and are

generally expected to be more polite than men (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Although we
identified no gender differences in our studies, there may be circumstances in which
women suffer greater backlash for impolite honesty than men. This may also be the case
for low-power individuals who are expected to conform to politeness norms (Brown &
Levinson, 1987). Sanctions for impolite honesty may have detrimental consequences in
organizations by curbing the flow of information and curtailing employee voice.
A final open question is whether prosocial liars are strategic or truly prosocial.
Individuals have a strong desire to be viewed favorably by others (Baumeister, 1982;
Jones & Wortman, 1973; Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Tetlock, 2002) and telling someone
nice things, regardless of one’s true beliefs, may be a strategic way to garner future
favors. This may be particularly likely when the lie goes undetected.
Conclusion
We challenge the assumption that deception harms trust. Prior studies of
deception have confounded lying with selfish intentions. By disentangling the effects of
intentions from deception, we demonstrate that deception itself does not always harm
trust. Although prosocial lies harm integrity-based trust, they increase benevolence-based
trust. In many cases, we find that intentions matter far more than veracity.
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Appendix A. Materials for Rely-or-Verify (Study 4)
Instructions to participants in Study 4:
As BLUE Player, you will report whether the amount of money in the jar of coins below is ODD or EVEN:

If you correctly report whether the amount of money in the jar is ODD or EVEN, you will earn $1.50. If
you inaccurately report if the amount of money in the jar is ODD or EVEN, you will earn $0.
Your partner is RED Player. RED Player's bonus payment also depends on your choice.
[page break]
You will be asked to report whether the amount of money in this jar of coins is ODD or EVEN.
1. Before you do, you will receive a message from RED Player.
•
•
•
•

RED Player knows the amount of money in the jar.
RED Player will send you one of the following two messages: "The amount of money in the jar is
ODD." or "The amount of money in the jar is EVEN."
The message that RED Player sends could be accurate or inaccurate.
You will not know whether or not the message is accurate or inaccurate when you make the choice
to RELY on the message or VERIFY the message.

2. Once you've received the message from RED Player, you can choose to RELY on RED
Player's message, or you can VERIFY the message.
3. If you choose RELY, you will be paid based on whether or not RED Player gave
you accurate or inaccurate information.
•
•

If RED Player gave you accurate information and you RELY on it, you will correctly report
whether the amount of money in the jar is ODD or EVEN, and you will earn $1.50. RED
Player will earn $0.75.
If RED Player gave you inaccurate information and you RELY on it, you will incorrectly report
whether the amount of money in the jar is ODD or EVEN, and you will earn $0. RED Player will
earn $1.50.
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4. If you choose VERIFY, $0.50 will be subtracted from your total earnings and you will learn the correct
amount of money in the jar.
• If RED Player gave you accurate information and you VERIFY it, you will earn $1 ($1.50 for
the correct answer - $0.50 cost of verification) and RED Player will earn $0.50.
• If RED Player gave you inaccurate information and you VERIFY it, you will earn $1 ($1.50 for
the correct answer - $0.50 cost of verification) and RED Player will earn $0.
Your decisions are represented in the figure below.

Comprehension check questions for Rely-or-Verify:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Suppose RED Player sends you an accurate message. Will you earn more if you RELY or VERIFY?
Suppose RED Player sends you an inaccurate message. Will you earn more if you RELY or
VERIFY?
How much does it cost to VERIFY?
If you RELY on RED Player's message, would RED Player earn more if s/he had sent a message that
was accurate or inaccurate?

Appendix B. Items used to measure attitudinal trust in Trust game and Rely-or-Verify
(Study 4)
•
•
•
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I trust my partner. [Rely-or-Verify uses identical measure].
I am willing to make myself vulnerable to my partner. [Rely-or-Verify uses
identical measure].
I am confident that my partner will return half the money. [I am confident that my
partner sent me an accurate message.]

Note. All items were anchored at 1 = “Strongly disagree” and 7 = “Strongly agree.”

69

Tables
Table 1. Payoffs associated with lying and honesty in Studies 1a, 1b, 2, 3a, and 3b

Experienced
or Observed
Deception

Deception
Game

Type of Lie

Payoffs
associated
with Truth
(Option A)

Payoffs
associated
with Lie
(Option B)

Study 1a

Experienced

Coin Flip
Game

Altruistic Lie

Sender
Receiver

$2.00
$0.00

$1.75
$1.00

Study 1b

Observed

Coin Flip
Game

Altruistic Lie

Sender
Receiver

$2.00
$0.00

$1.75
$1.00

Study 2

Observed

Coin Flip
Game

Prosocial Lie

Sender
Receiver

$2.00
$0.00

$2.00
$1.00

Mutually
beneficial Lie

Sender
Receiver

$2.00
$0.00

$2.25
$1.00

Altruistic Lie

Sender
Receiver

$2.00
$0.00

$1.75
$1.00

Selfish Lie

Sender
Receiver

$1.75
$1.00

$2.00
$0.00

Studies
a
3a and 3b

Observed

Number
Game (3a)
Coin Flip
Game (3b)

Note. a Study 3b also included two control conditions. In control condition 1, the Sender
faced the Altruistic Lie choice set, and in control condition 2, the Sender faced the Selfish
lie choice set. However, in both control conditions, the Sender’s decision was unknown.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics and correlations for measures in Studies 1, 2, and 3
Study 1a
Scale

M(SD)

1

2

3
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a

1. Trusting behavior
2. Attitudinal trust
3. Benevolence
4. Deception

43.8%
3.23 (1.91) 0.88**
3.82 (1.48) 0.51**
4.10 (1.84) 0.09

0.64**
0.08

-0.08

Study 1b
Scale

M(SD)

2

3

1. Trusting behavior
2. Attitudinal trust
3. Benevolence
4. Deception

29.6%a
3.08(1.65) 0.70**
3.95 (1.25) 0.47**
4.15 (1.72) -0.11+

0.61**
-0.13*

-0.29**

Study 2
Scale

M(SD)

2

3

1

1

a

1. Trusting behavior
2. Attitudinal trust
3. Benevolence
4. Deception

50.2%
3.41(1.88) 0.73**
4.10 (1.33) 0.49**
4.13 (1.86) 0.08

0.63**
0.01

0.05

Study 3a
Scale

M(SD)

2

3

1

a

1. Trusting behavior
2. Attitudinal trust
3. Benevolence
4. Deception

36.2%
3.25(1.84) 0.72**
4.12 (1.40) 0.41**
4.09 (2.42) -0.12*

0.67**
-0.25**

-0.34**

Study 3b
Scale

M(SD)

2

3

1. Trusting behavior
2. Attitudinal trust
3. Benevolence
4. Deception

47.2%a
3.31(1.95) 0.72**
4.16 (1.40) 0.68**
3.92 (2.27) -0.26**

0.68**
-0.26**

-0.38**

1

Notes. a This number represents the percent of participants who passed in the trust game.
** p < .001, *p < .05, +p = .07
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Table 3. Supplemental regressions for Study 3a

Logistic regression on Trusting Behavior
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Intentions,
Lying,
Intentions x
Lying

Intentions,
Lying,
Intentions x
Lying,
Benevolence

Intentions,
Lying,
Intentions x
Lying,
Deception

Intentions,
Lying,
Intentions x
Lying,
Benevolence
Deception

Constant

-.601**
(0.122)

-3.887**
(0.601)

0.766+
(0.411)

-2.973***
(0.839)

Intentions

0.498**
(0.122)

0.019
(0.151)

0.482**
(0.125)

0.042
(0.153)

Lying

-0.002
(0.122)

0.177
(0.134)

.697**
(0.244)

.506+
(0.261)

Intentions x Lying

0.032
(0.122)

-0.005
(0.131)

0.025
(0.125)

-0.005
(0.132)

Benevolence

0.769**
(0.133)

Deception

R-Squared

0.054

0.165

0.709***
(0.139)
-0.343**
(0.100)

-0.166
(0.111)

0.093

0.181

Notes. **b is significant at p ≤ .01,*= p<.05. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Independent variables used in each regression are listed in the top row.
Deception was contrast-coded: -1 = Honest, 1 = Lie. Intentions was contrast-coded: -1 =
Selfish, 1 = Prosocial.
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Table 4. The payoffs associated with prosocial lying in Study 4

Type of Lie

Payoffs associated
with Truth

Payoffs associated
with Lie

Round 1

Altruistic Lie

Sender
Receiver

$2.00
$0.25

$1.50
$1.00

Round 2

Mutuallybeneficial Lie

Sender
Receiver

$1.50
$0.25

$2.00
$1.00

Round 3

Altruistic Lie

Sender
Receiver

$1.25
$0.25

$1.00
$1.00

Round 4

Mutuallybeneficial Lie

Sender
Receiver

$1.00
$0.25

$1.25
$1.00
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics and correlations for measures in Study 4

Trust Game
Scale

M(SD)

1

2

3

a

1. Trusting behavior
2. Attitudinal trust
3. Benevolence
4. Deception

48.50%
3.82 (1.99) 0.84**
4.44 (1.55) 0.49**
3.83 (2.34) 0.07

0.70**
0.03

0.06

Rely-or-Verify
Scale

M(SD)

2

3

0.65**
-0.39**

-0.21**

1. Trusting behavior
2. Attitudinal trust
3. Benevolence
4. Deception

1
b

47.20%
4.01 (1.73) 0.80**
4.38 (1.42) 0.41**
3.76 (2.31) -0.25**

Notes. **p < .001.
This number represents the percent of participants who passed in the trust game
b
This number represents the percent of participants who chose “Rely” in Rely-or-Verify.
a
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Figures

Trusting Behavior

(% Passing in the trust game)

Figure 1. The effect of altruistic lying on trusting behavior (Studies 1a and 1b).

Honesty

Altruistic Lie

56%
32%

Study 1a - Experienced Deception

39%
21%
Study 1b - Observed Deception

Note. Main effect of altruistic lying in both studies: ps < .01.

Trusting Behavior

(% of participants who passed in the trust game)

Figure 2. The effect of prosocial and mutually beneficial lying on trusting behavior
(Study 2)

Honesty

Lie

69%

59%

36%

Mutually Beneficial Lie

37%

Prosocial Lie

Note. Effect of lying for mutually-beneficial and prosocial lies: each p < .01.
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Figure 3. Trusting behavior (Study 3a).

Trusting Behavior
(% of participants who passed in the trust game)

Honesty

Lie

47%

26%

48%

24%

Selfish Intentions

Altruistic Intentions

Note. Main effect of intentions: p < .01. Main effect of lying: ns.
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Figure 4. Trusting behavior (Study 3b).
Payment Structure:

Trusting Behavior
(% of participants who passed in the trust game)

Altruistic Lie-Selfish Honesty

Altruistic Honesty-Selfish Lie
71%

44%
28%
Selfish
Honesty

22%

Selfish
Lie

Selfish Intentions

66%

49%

Control 1 Control 2

Control (No Information)

Altruistic Altruistic
Honesty
Lie

Altruistic Intensions

Note. Main effect of decision (Selfish, Control, Altruistic): p < .01. Main effect of
payment structure: ns.

Figure 5. The Rely-or-Verify game (Study 4)
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Note. This depicts the general form of Rely-or-Verify. The exact game we used in Study
4 is depicted in Appendix A. In Rely-or-Verify, the payoffs for Player 1 are structured
such that a 1 > c 1 ≥ d 1 > b 1. The payoffs for Player 2 are structured such that c 2 > d 2 ≥ b 2 > a 2.
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Trusting Behavior
(% of participants who chose "Pass" or "Rely")

Figure 6. Trusting behavior (Study 4).

Honesty
56.8%

40.0%

Trust Game

Prosocial Lies

57.3%

37.4%

Rely-or-Verify Game

Note. Deception x Game interaction: p < .01. Main effects of deception and game: ns.

